

Tools For Legislative Oversight An Empirical Investigation

Parliaments are the institutions through which governments are held accountable to the electorate. They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this oversight function, but until recently little analysis had been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools. This paper uses data for 83 countries that was collected in 2001 to investigate whether the oversight potential relates to three variables, namely the form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary), per capita income levels, and the level of democracy. The paper finds that oversight potential is greatly affected by the form of government, per capita income levels, and levels of democracy. Countries with parliamentary forms of government, higher income levels, and which are more democratic have a greater number of oversight tools and greater oversight potential. While the oversight potential follows this general trend, the use of committees of enquiry, interpellations and ombudsman offices follows a different pattern. The use of interpellations as an oversight tool is most common in high income countries, less common in low income countries and least common in middle income countries while the presence of committees of enquiry and of the ombudsman offices is most common in middle income countries, less common in high income countries and least common in low income countries.

This book provides an assessment of public financial management (PFM) reforms in developing countries using Turkey as a case study. The book elaborates on revenue management, expenditure management, public budget, public financial management information systems, asset and liability management, intergovernmental fiscal relations, accounting, financial reporting, and auditing. Bringing together academics and practitioners, the book analyzes the PFM reforms in the light of theoretical explanations and practices to reveal the achievements, challenges, and future perspectives of PFM. Oversight of executives has always been a key function of parliaments and one that is central to developing the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government. However, in reality governments are taking a more pronounced role in controlling legislation, diluting the influence of parliament. This book plots this trend in parliaments across Europe, to illustrate points of convergence and divergence. In so doing, it suggest tools and methods that parliaments can develop to bolster their crucial oversight role.

This book examines the problem of accountability in two African political systems, South Africa and Nigeria. Despite the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine of checks and balances among the institutions of governance, a burgeoning governance crisis stifles the potential of accountability and good governance. Legislative oversight in the two countries remains largely ineffective while citizens are left to face the consequences of the mismanagement of public resources by political elites. This book critically assesses how the legislative institutions in South Africa and Nigeria have been unable to harness the requisite constitutional powers to ensure accountability in government and explores the feasibility of their effectiveness. The book begins with a comparative analysis of the principles, tradition, and powers associated with legislative capability in South Africa and Nigeria. The chapters explore constitutional provisions and analyze the capacity of each legislature to function within its respective political environment. The book also examines the process and challenges associated with the various measures and mechanisms available for legislatures to ensure accountability in the two countries. Researchers, scholars and students of African politics will find this book useful in their understanding of the problems associated with the simmering governance crisis in South Africa and Nigeria.

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In 2002, David McGee wrote a comprehensive report on two important elements in the system of public financial accountability, namely the office of the Auditor General and the parliamentary oversight committee commonly referred to as the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). The purpose of the present paper is to deepen McGee's analysis of PACs. In particular, the authors define PAC success and identify those factors that affect PAC performance. They use data that were collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002, when a survey questionnaire was sent to 51 national and state/provincial parliaments in Commonwealth countries in Asia and Australasia, and Canada and the United Kingdom. The authors find that the institutional factors which most account for the success of the PACs are the focus on government's financial activity rather than its policies, the power to investigate all past and present government expenses, the power to follow up on government action in response to its recommendations, and its relationship with the Auditors General.

In Hong Kong's Legislature Under China's Sovereignty: 1998-2013 Dr Gu Yu thoroughly analyses how Hong Kong's legislature has impacted the law-making process as well as the financial control and supervision of the executive branch of the government.

In most countries, parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee government and to hold government to account; often, audit institutions, ombuds and anti-corruption agencies report to parliament, as a means of ensuring both their independence from government and reinforcing parliament's position at the apex of accountability institutions. At the same time, parliaments can also play a key role in promoting accountability, through constituency outreach, public hearings, and parliamentary commissions. This title will be of interest to parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, development practitioners, students of development and those interested in curbing corruption and improving governance in developing and developed countries alike.

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In most countries, parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee and hold government to account. In light of the increased focus on good governance, academics and legislative strengthening practitioners are re-examining parliament's oversight function with a view to increasing public financial accountability, curbing corruption, and contributing to poverty reduction. This volume brings together research from many different perspectives and many different legislative settings worldwide. As the country case studies in section III demonstrate, the accountability mechanisms or oversight tools available to the legislature vary based on constitutionally defined powers of the legislature, institutional arrangements between the branches of government, divisions of authority between national, regional, and local governments, the degree of legitimacy conferred on the legislature, and the resources available to it. The budget process provides critical opportunities. Section II of this volume is devoted to examining budget oversight from the formulation and approval of the budget, to implementation and the ex post examination of the public accounts. Special attention is also paid to mechanisms to assist parliaments such as Public Accounts Committees and independent parliamentary budget offices. This title will be of interest to parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, legislative strengthening practitioners, and students of legislative development.

This book investigates Parliaments' capacity to oversee government activities, policies and expenditures. Utilising a comparative approach, the book presents a new examination of oversight tools and discusses the conditions under which such tools are employed effectively. The result of a 9-year collaboration between the authors, this book draws from the findings of survey data collected by the World Bank Institute and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, analysing information from 120 parliaments. The book represents a rigorous attempt to test whether international organizations are correct in claiming that the quality of democracy and good governance can be improved by strengthening the oversight capacity of legislatures. It discusses the tools available to parliaments worldwide, and taking a comparative approach considers which tools are more or less common, how oversight capacity can be estimated, how oversight capacity is related to other institutional and constitutional factors, and above all what ensures that oversight tools are used effectively. This analysis reveals that while the quality of democracy and good governance benefit from effective oversight, oversight effectiveness cannot be reduced to oversight capacity. The book urges policy makers and reformers to change their approach from strengthening capacity to securing that the capacity is put to good use. Parliamentary Oversight Tools will be of interest to students, scholars and practitioners of legislative politics and governance.

This book investigates parliaments' role in curbing corruption. In addition to discussing the definition, causes, and costs of corruption and the role that parliaments have in reducing corruption, the authors consider contemporary issues that parliamentarians – and others – need to be aware of. These include the importance of broad-based coalitions to fight corruption and networking at the country, regional and global level, the importance – and difficulties – of establishing parliamentary codes of ethics/conduct, legislative oversight tools and mechanisms, and regional/international conventions against corruption. Attention will also be given to parliaments and anti-money laundering. Corruption and Legislatures presents a non-technical review of contemporary issues and recent developments in curbing corruption, and concludes with practical advice as to what can be done to ensure more effective parliamentary involvement in curbing corruption.

Who determines the fuel standards for our cars? What about whether Plan B, the morning-after pill, is sold at the local pharmacy? Many people assume such important and controversial policy decisions originate in the halls of Congress. But the choreographed actions of Congress and the president account for only a small portion of the laws created in the United States. By some estimates, more than ninety percent of law is created by administrative rules issued by federal agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services, where unelected bureaucrats with particular policy goals and preferences respond to the incentives created by a complex, procedure-bound rulemaking process. With *Bending the Rules*, Rachel Augustine Potter shows that rulemaking is not the rote administrative activity it is commonly imagined to be but rather an intensely political activity in its own right. Because rulemaking occurs in a separation of powers system, bureaucrats are not free to implement their preferred policies unimpeded: the president, Congress, and the courts can all get involved in the process, often at the bidding of affected interest groups. However, rather than capitulating to demands, bureaucrats routinely employ “procedural politicking,” using their deep knowledge of the process to strategically insulate their proposals from political scrutiny and interference. Tracing the rulemaking process from when an agency first begins working on a rule to when it completes that regulatory action, Potter show how bureaucrats use procedures to resist interference from Congress, the President, and the courts at each stage of the process. This exercise reveals that unelected bureaucrats wield considerable influence over the direction of public policy in the United States.

Does Congress do a good job of overseeing the work of the important legislative agencies--the EPA, FDA, OSHA, and others--that it has established to protect the public from some of the risks of modern technology? Combining analysis and anecdote, Christopher H. Foreman, Jr. looks into the oversight tools available to Congress, the variety of interest groups involved, the kinds of issues that arise between agencies and congressional committees, and the personal networks that affect relations between them; and he suggests what Congress can and should do to improve the process of social regulation. "Foreman adds substantially to our understanding of the role played by oversight. . . . A solid contribution toward understanding the nature of day-to-day congressional oversight."--Burdett Loomis, *Journal of Politics* " This book] is presented clearly, free from jargon, whether academic or governmental. . . . A solid discussion of oversight."--Jan P. Vermeer, *Perspective* "This is a thoughtful, effectively organized, and well-written book. Those concerned with legislative oversight will find it highly useful."--Morris S. Ogul, University of Pittsburgh Winner of the 1989 D. B. Hardeman Prize given by the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library for the best book on Congress in the twentieth century

The purpose of the book is to investigate parliaments' capacity to oversee government activities, policies and budget legislation. By analysing the survey data that the World Bank Institute in collaboration with the Inter-Parliamentary Union collected from 120 parliaments, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst show what tools are available to parliaments worldwide, which tools are more or less common, how oversight capacity can be estimated, how oversight capacity is related to other institutional and constitutional factors. In addition to discussing the conditions under which oversight capacity is greater, the authors perform some analyses to assess the policy implications of oversight capacity. Specifically, they look at the impact of oversight capacity on the quality of democracy and on the level of good governance.

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Building an effective, inclusive, and accountable public administration has become a major point of attention for policymakers and academics in Ethiopia who want to realise sustainable development. This first handbook on Ethiopian Public Administration is written by Ethiopian academics and practitioner-academics and builds on PhD studies and conference papers, including studies presented at the meetings of the Ethiopian Public Administration Association (EPAA), established in 2016. Public Administration in Ethiopia presents a wide range of timely issues in

four thematic parts: Governance, Human Resources, Performance and Quality, and Governance of Policies. Each of the individual chapters in this volume contributes in a different way to the overarching research questions: How can we describe and explain the contexts, the processes and the results of the post-1990 politico-administrative reforms in Ethiopia? And what are the implications for sustainable development? This book is essential for students, practitioners, and theorists interested in public administration, public policy, and sustainable development. Moreover, the volume is a valuable stepping stone for PA teaching and PA research in Ethiopia.

This book provides a comprehensive treatment of the new tools of public action and the implications they have for public management and policy design. An initial set of chapters describe the different tools and analyze their patterns of use, the management tasks they entail, and the situations for which they are most appropriate. Other chapters provide a general overview and examine the broader issues that this shift in the public-sector role from provider to enabler poses eg. redefinition of public management, the problem of ensuring accountability in third-party relationships, new public and nonprofit management skill requirements, international experience with alternative tools, and the implications of the shift in public-sector role for democratic governance. This volume is a valuable resource for anyone interested in how government functions today and how it seems likely to function in the future.

The purpose of this paper is to deepen David McGee's analysis of Public Accounts Committees (PACs) and to define PAC success and identify those factors that impact on PAC performance. This book explores the institutionalization process with regard to the Parliament in Bangladesh, and seeks to identify the main constraints that hinder the Parliament from serving as the uppermost representative body for all segments of society. This book sheds valuable new light on key reform initiatives carried out by donor communities in collaboration with the Bangladesh Parliament between the years 1991 and 2015 by presenting an extensive selection of donor proposals to make the Parliament a more potent political institution. The book also focused on the barriers of strengthening oversight, fiscal oversight in particular, resourcing parliament and its secretariat, hindering gender equality and gender responsiveness, counteracting forces that are weakening rule of law, civil liberty of the citizens, constitutionalism and democratic consolidation in the country. The book presents a comparative picture of the pre- and post-reform Bangladesh Parliament, highlighting on the issue of how much the donor assistance can help promote institutionalization of the parliament and democratic consolidation of a developing country. The book will be of immense value to all scholars interested in democratic governance, administrative reforms, policy studies and the role of parliament as a watchdog ensuring accountability, transparency and national integrity.

This book investigates parliaments' role in curbing corruption. In addition to discussing the definition, causes, and costs of corruption and the role that parliaments have in reducing corruption, the authors consider contemporary issues that parliamentarians – and others – need to be aware of. These include the importance of broad-based coalitions to fight corruption and networking at the country, regional and global level, the importance – and difficulties – of establishing parliamentary codes of ethics/conduct, legislative oversight tools and mechanisms, and regional/international conventions against corruption. Attention will also be given to parliaments and anti-money laundering. Corruption and Legislatures presents a non-technical review of contemporary issues and recent developments in curbing corruption, and concludes with practical advice as to what can be done to ensure more effective parliamentary involvement in curbing corruption.

This book provides an overview of the federal government agencies that participate in U.S. export promotion efforts, as well as the issues that they raise for Congress. The recent global economic downturn has renewed congressional debate over the role of the federal government in promoting exports. This debate has been heightened with the Obama Administration's introduction of the National Export Initiative (NEI) in the 2010 State of the Union Address. Some Members of Congress have placed greater priority on understanding the co-ordination, budgets, and functions of federal agencies involved in export promotion. Such an understanding may increase congressional oversight of export promotion policy and related legislative activity.

This book discusses parliamentary oversight and its role in curbing corruption in developing countries. Over the past decade, a growing body of research at the global and regional levels has demonstrated that parliamentary oversight is an important determinant of corruption and that effective oversight of public expenditure is an essential component of national anti-corruption strategies and programs. However, little research has been undertaken at the country level regarding how parliamentary oversight is undertaken, which oversight mechanisms are effective or on how national parliaments interact with other anti-corruption stakeholders. This book presents the results of a new large-scale, quantitative analysis which identifies the mechanisms through which institutional arrangements impact corruption, specifically through country case studies on the Caribbean region, Ghana, Myanmar, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. Addressing a gap in scholarly knowledge while presenting practical policy advice for parliaments and for anti-corruption assistance agencies, this book will be of use to scholars interested in development, anti-corruption, public finance, as well as members of parliament, anti-corruption practitioners, and organizations working in parliamentary strengthening.

This book is based on experience and reflections related to international support provided to parliaments and legislative bodies both in selected countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, Serbia, and Kyrgyzstan) and globally. The author intends to provide a critique of parliamentary support, as part of development assistance or foreign aid, for having been conceived in narrow terms of technical assistance and for failing to appreciate that aid effectiveness calls for a sound understanding of a country's politics, culture, and history. The monograph examines the effectiveness of aid in both stable democracies, and fragile and transition countries. The project is ideal for audiences interested in regional politics, the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, and development/democracy studies.

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